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tinguished	 from	more	 familiar	worries,	 for	 instance	 that	markets  in	












Recently,	 Jason	 Brennan	 and	 Peter	 Jaworski	 have	 developed	 an	























On	 these	grounds,	Brennan	and	 Jaworski	 conclude	 that	 semiotic	
arguments	 against	markets	 fail.	 They	don’t	 really	 argue	 for	 any	par-
ticular	 consequentialist	 analysis	of	norms.	 Instead,	 they	 spend	 their	
time	on	the	offensive.	There	is	so	little	to	be	said	for	such	arguments,	
they	suggest,	that	it	is	reasonable	to	believe	many	advocates	are	just	



























this	 argument	 might	 go.	 One	 thought	 is	 that	 individual	 market	 ex-













6.	 To	defend	the	 thesis	 that	market	exchange	 is	always	positive	sum	(at	 least	
in	the	short	term,	ignoring	externalities),	 it	would	need	to	be	the	case	that	
people	only	ever	entered	into	contracts	that	are	in	their	best	interest.	To	de-
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against	the	bonds	of	society.”15	A	few	years	later,	the	Communist Mani-




semiotic	 opportunity	 costs	 of	 expanding	markets.	 There	 are	 incom-
patibilities	between	what	productive markets	signal	and	what	various	
other	social	practices	do.	
The	 key	 point	 is	 that	 the	 contingency	 thesis	—	which	 pertains	 to	





























2. Deontological and Consequentialist Semiotic Objections 
Many	semiotic	arguments	against	markets	—	including	 those	quoted	



















1844 Manuscripts,	 elaborating	 Shakespeare, he	 said	 that	 ‘…	 money	
…	 appears	 as	 this  distorting  power	 both	 against	 the	 individual	 and	
12.	 Compare	the	helpful	analogy	with	gendered	norms	in	Brennan	and	Jaworski	
(2015a,	1070).





	 barry	maguire	&	brookes	brown Markets, Interpersonal Practices, and Signal Distortion
philosophers’	imprint	 –		4		–	 vol.	19,	no.	14	(april	2019)
undertaken	with	an	eye	to	a	range	of	different	systemic	costs	and	ben-
efits	—	from	markets,	 as	 the	productivity	 thesis	 notes,	 but	 also	 from	
these	non-market	social	practices.	
An	 important	methodological	 point:	Our	 strategy	 is	 to	 appeal	 to	
the	features	of	markets	that	are	necessary	for	the	productivity	advan-
tages,	and	to	argue	that	those	very	features	are	responsible	for	a	range	





































paid	 to	argue	 that	 tobacco	 isn’t	 all	 that	harmful,	or	paid	 to	applaud	
arias,	 it	will	 be	harder	 for	 the	 family	 of	 the	deceased	 to	 know	how	
many	 audience	 members	 attended	 to	 express	 their	 respect	 for	 the	
dead,	and	harder	for	the	public	to	trust	cigarette-related	science,	and	
harder	 for	 the	 singer,	 or	 the	pundits,	 or	 the	 audience	 to	know	how	
well	 the	aria	was	received.	Markets	also	make	 it	harder	 for	 these	at-
titudes	to	be	expressed	at	all.	The	genuinely	appreciative	members	of	
the	audience	will	be	 less	able	 to	effectively	 signal	 their	 enthusiasm.	
Genuine	science	may	be	impugned.	Or	to	take	another	of	Brennan	and	










intrinsic	 sources	 of	 value	 in	 their	 own	 right.	 At	 the	 limit,	 many	 of	
these	practices	would	be	impossible	without	effective	semiotic	norms.	
At	 the	 end	of	 the	day,	 the	 consequentialist	 analysis	will	 have	 to	 be	

























There	are,	however,	 some	 restrictions	on	what	 can	count	as	 con-
sideration	 in	order	 for	 the	exchange	 to	be	recognizable	as	a	market	
exchange.	The	consideration	is	not	merely	the	benefit	the	service	pro-
vides	for	the	recipient.	For	then,	one	would	be	selling	one’s	life	when	
one	 dived	 on	 the	 grenade	 to	 save	 one’s	 friends.	 The	 consideration	
needs	to	be	a	good	or	service	put	at	the	disposal	of	the	seller	(who	may	
request	the	good	to	be	given	to	a	third	party,	or	simply	destroyed).	The	
seller	 receives	property	 rights	 in	 the	consideration	as	part	of	 the	ex-
change.	It	is	then	up	to	the	seller’s	discretion	what	they	do	with	those	
property	rights.	






















4. The Significance of Market Exchange 







21.	 Here,	we	 follow	a	 long	history	 in	 legal	 theory	whereby	exchanges	 for	 con-
sideration	are	distinguished	(among	other	things)	from	‘gratuitous	promises’	
undertaken	without	contracted	quid pro quo (see	the	seminal	opinion	in	Mills 
v. Wyman,	20	Mass.	207,	[Mass.	1825]).
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as	a	potential	participant	in	a	market	exchange.	In	one	important	re-




The	 exchange	does,	 however,	 signal	 something	 about	Angela’s	 at-
titude	towards	A	and	B.	The	exchange	signals	that	Angela	is	willing	to	
exchange	A	for	any	consideration	at	all	(which	could	be	very	signifi-









ing she could have gotten far more?	Or	for	B	knowing it would cost Mildred 































Let’s	 suppose	 that	Angela	exchanges	some	A	 for	B	with	Mildred.	
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we	have	said,	perhaps	Angela	knew	she	could	have	exchanged	A	for	



























Of	course,	you	can	also	simply	 tell	 someone	 that	you	care	about	
them.	But	after	all,	 talk	is	cheap.	The	most	compelling	way	to	signal	











advantages	 of	 markets.25	 An	 effective	 price	 system	 solves	 Hayek’s	
knowledge	problem,	rendering	knowledge	of	the	millions	of	little	ex-
planations	 of	 need	 and	provision	unnecessary	 for	 effective	 distribu-
tion.26	Prices	are	a	function	of	facts	about	the	willingness	to	exchange	
of	situated	individuals,	and	these	facts	are	signaled	by	their	individual	




























you	 a	 ticket	 to	 a	 concert	might	 otherwise	have	had.	My	giving	 you	
the	ticket	in	this	situation	doesn’t	signal	much	of	anything	apart	from	




















actually	 “thanking”	 those	acknowledged	 in	 the	silver,	platinum,	and	
gold	tiers,	all	parasitic	signaling	behavior	to	the	contrary.	












Minimally,	 what	 we	 are	 saying	 is	 that	 behavior	 that	 would	 oth-

















care	and	would	have	come	for	 free.	Since	 it	 is	 reasonable	 to	believe	
they	would	come	for	the	pay	even	if	they	did	not	care,	the	signal	is	no	
longer	effective.	
The	 key	 fact	 here	 is	 just	 that	 the	 service	 doesn’t	 cost	 the	 server	
anything.	 It	 just	 so	 happens	 that	 certain	market	 exchanges	 (specifi-
cally,	those	that	are	at	least	adequate)	have	this	property.	Note,	other	



















and	 intentions	 towards	 us	 of	 other	 human	 beings,	 and	
the	 great	 extent	 to	which	 our	 personal	 feelings	 and	 re-
actions	depend	upon,	or	involve,	our	beliefs	about	these	
attitudes	and	intentions.33
































In	 the	 case	 of	 esteem,	we	have	 a	 range	 of	 positive	 and	negative	 at-
titudes	that	we	express	towards	the	behaviors	of	others.	We	thereby	













the	 funeral	 to	pay	 their	 respects	wear	 a	 green	 shirt,	 and	 those	who	
are	paid	to	attend	wear	polka	dots.	All	that	is	fine	as	far	as	it	goes.	But	
the	problem	would	reassert	 itself	 if	people	were	paid	 to	wear	green	
shirts	to	the	funeral,	as	they	likely	would	be.	Then,	on-lookers	could	









6. In Praise of Market Norms (and Non-Market Norms)
At	this	point,	bearing	in	mind	the	productivity	advantages	of	markets,	






































Indeed,	 the	 costs	 extend	 beyond	what	 we	 can	 say	 to	 the	 world	
to	touch	on	how	we	can	be	in	the	world.	Caring,	for	example,	is	not	
merely	 an	 internal	 attitude.	 It	 is	 an	 interpersonal	 relation.	 To	 have	
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Impersonal	 norms	 and	 closed	 relationships	 also	 permit	 substi-
















ciple	 and	 in	 historical	 practice	—	liberating	 people	 from	


















leaves	 the	 parties	 where	 they	 were	 beforehand,	 normatively	 speak-
ing.	Perhaps	one	is	more	inclined	to	trust	someone	with	whom	one	
has	engaged	in	a	successful	market	exchange	than	a	stranger,	on	the	




justified	 in	walking	 away.	 The	 actor	Charlie	 Sheen	notoriously	 said	
when	asked	why	he	hired	a	prostitute:	“I	don’t	pay	them	to	sleep	with	
me,	I	pay	them	to	go	away.”	
There	 are	 also	prevailing	norms	 according	 to	which	markets	 are	
impersonal	 in	various	ways,	and	these	norms	provide	a	range	of	 im-
portant	 benefits.	 Impersonal	 relationships	 reduce	 transaction	 costs,	
making	it	possible	for	each	of	us	to	acquire	valuable	goods	more	easily,	
and,	 for	similar	 reasons,	 increasing	 the	efficiency	of	production	 in	a	
way	that	maximizes	available	goods.	This	is	tremendously	beneficial,	
especially	 in	 today’s	 massive	 interconnected	 societies.	 Some	 goods	
we	would	rather	not	have	people	know	we	buy	(sex	machines,	hem-




sonal	 intercourse,	 but	 rather	 because	we	 prefer	 to	 disaggregate	 the	






















that	we	accept	 such	more	expansive	norms	 for	some	of	our	 relation-
ships;	this	is	sufficient	to	draw	the	relevant	comparison.



















their	place.	We	 look	 for	 impersonal	exchange	 in	 systems	of	peer	 re-
view,	 in	 the	 judiciary,	 in	 competitive	 sports	—	and	 correspondingly,	
there	are	impersonal	norms	in	all	these	cases.39	We	would	criticize	you	
for	 privileging	 your	 sister	 in	 peer	 review,	 or	 on	 trial,	 or	 in	 a	 tennis	
championship.	Remember,	our	thesis	is	not	that	there	is	anything	bad	
about	markets	 or	market	 norms.	Markets	 are	 extremely	 productive,	
and	the	norms	that	facilitate	that	productivity	have	their	own	merits.	
But	 they	 have	 important	 limits.	 There	 is	 also	 a	 consequentialist	
case	for	a	sphere	of	behavior	that	is	protected	from	markets.	There	are	







impersonal	exchanges	 in	all	 these	 respects.	When	your	 friend	gives	













































where,	not	all	 sex	elsewhere	becomes	 instantly	meaningless,	as	 though	by	
metaphysical	magic.	The	market	for	nurses	doesn’t	interfere	with	the	signal	










es	are	permissibly	 impersonal:	This	 facilitates	 faster	 transactions,	al-
lows	for	anonymity,	and	mitigates	a	range	of	discriminatory	behaviors.
This	 is	 not	 to	 say	 that	 all	 market	 exchanges	 are	 impersonal.	 Of	
course,	individuals	with	ongoing	personal	relations	can	interact	in	a	
marketplace.	 Indeed,	 this	 is	 likely	 to	promote	trust,	which	facilitates	
future	 trade.	 In	 order	 to	mitigate	 the	 difference	 between	 these	 two	
kinds	of	practices,	one	might	point	to	the	fact	 that	many	businesses	




















the	 non-marketized	 activity	 signals	 something	 that	 the	 marketized	
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ity	 to	offer	personal	 incentives,	 their	 feature	of	an	availability	of	 im-
personal	exchanges,	and	the	fact	that	they	are	normatively	closed	are	
powerful	sources	of	the	productive	advantages	yielded	by	the	market.	
These	market	 norms	 are	 benign.	 There	 is	 nothing	 bad	 about	 ex-
pressing	 one’s	willingness	 to	 do	more	work	 for	more	 pay,	 or	 about	
wanting	 to	 buy	 paper	 towels	 without	 making	 friends.	 Indeed,	 it	 is	
quite	wonderful	that	if	I	have	the	necessary	cash,	I	can	buy	those	paper	
towels	whatever	my	haircut,	religious	belief,	or	sexual	preferences	are.	
But	 insofar	as	 these	practices	 involve	behaviors	 that	serve	as	sig-
nals	for	one	or	another	practice,	they	will	begin	to	crowd	each	other	
out.	Markets	 in	behaviors	 associated	with	 signaling	 care,	or	 esteem,	
or	 testimony	will	 disrupt	 and	distort	 these	other	 signals	 in	 the	first	
instance	by	defeating	the	evidence	needed	for	uptake,	but	eventually	
by	defeating	the	standing	of	the	semiotic	norm	as	a	norm.	Unless	al-
ternative	 signals	 can	be	quickly	established	—	and	ones	 that	are	not	
themselves	subject	to	further	parasitic	distortion	—	these	practices	will	
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